Civil Service in CEE Countries: Where Institutions do not Work?: A Subjective Account on and Interpretation of Session 4 of TED5 by Gajduschek, György
1 
 
Civil Service in CEE countries: Where institutions do not work? A subjective account 
on and interpretation of Session 4 of TED5.
1
 
Gyorgy Gajduschek 
 
1. An overview 
The fourth session, moderated by Calin Hintea, dealt with the patronage, political 
appointments and politicization in CEE countries. The keynote speaker Maria Spirova 
delivered a presentation on a large-scale cross-European survey attacking the issue of 
patronage. The survey compares three CEE countries (Czech Republic, Bulgaria and 
Hungary) with one another and several other EU member states regarding the overall measure 
and the type of patronage and politicization. Miroslav Beblavy and Emilia Sicakova-Beblava 
defined various types of politicization and analyzed how these appear in Slovakia, a country 
whose civil service is considered as one of the most politicized in the EU. They argued that 
there are various types of political appointments, some of which takes into account 
professional qualities as well. For instance, if ministers appoint their staff political and/or 
personal loyalty is surely a selection criteria, but – as the performance of his/her staff, eg. PR 
officials, directly influences the ministers‟ career – skills of these persons is also taken into 
consideration. So called coalition appointments, on the other hand, are purely influenced by 
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party or personal links without any professional selection criteria. Juraj Nemec enlisted the 
major questions regarding the causes and effects of politicization and the differences among 
countries in that regard. Dorina Uzunova reviewed her research framework regarding 
politicization of agency heads and board members in ten selected Bulgarian executive 
agencies. The aim of her research was to (a) identify the degree and (b) the type of 
politicization, based on the approach elaborated in a previous work of Meyer-Sahling on 
modes of politicization.  Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling presented his findings from a comparative 
research of politicization of senior civil servants in CEE countries that joined EU in 2004.
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Besides an analytical framework, Meyer-Sahling, like Spirova, provides us with quantitative 
measures of politicization; though Spirova‟s research scope is wider, including West-
European countries too.  
A lively discussion facilitated by Koen Verhoest followed the presentations. Several 
contradictory issues popped up during this discussion that touched upon the topics like path 
dependency and the impact of Western patterns, the impact of EU “expectations” 
(conditionality at the accession phase and the changing situation after) and political, 
administrative and cultural traditions in CEE countries. In the following I will, in an 
admittedly subjective manner, discuss only a few such core questions that may have further 
implications for research. 
2. “Western concepts” in explaining politicization in CEEC 
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The first question is whether it is possible to directly apply research concepts elaborated 
mostly in the US or in the “Western World to CEE reality. Verheijen, based on a large-scale 
comparative research, concluded several years ago that the civil service systems of CEE 
countries do not seem to fit to the „somewhat Western centric” (Verheijen 1999: 336) theories 
and categorizations. Seemingly, Mayer-Sahling (Meyer-Sahling – Veen, 2012) reaches a 
similar conclusion by indicating that politicization serves perfectly different purposes in this 
region. Furthermore, he also proves that the theories and the very concepts that were 
elaborated in Western Europe do not really work in the region. Whereas in the West robust 
competition between the ruling and the opposition parties may effectively reduce 
politicization, the same phenomenon in the CEE region leads to a perfectly opposite result: 
Regular wholesale alternations between ideological blocs at elections undoubtedly increase 
politicization of the senior civil service. Beblavy and Sicakova-Beblava also argue that special 
forms of politicization can be identified in Slovakia that have not been described in the 
English-language literature. The research of Spirova (Kopecký – Spirova 2011) starts from a 
categorization of communist systems and attempts to explain the present variation among 
post-communist countries from the variance in communist systems. On the other hand the 
authors indicate that, at least based on the survey data they rely on, post-communist EU 
countries do not seem to be outliers in terms of patronage; rather they are somewhere in the 
middle and there are countries, especially in the South,
3
 where politicization is higher than in 
most CEE countries. It seems that whereas CEE countries reveal attributes that cannot be 
explained by the conceptual framework elaborated in the mainstream Western literature, there 
could be findings that may be valid not only for CEE countries but potentially to some South-
European systems and/or – as suggested, for instance, by Goetz (2001) – to Latin America as 
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well. On the other hand, findings from these areas may be more relevant in understanding 
CEE patterns than those emanating from the US and North-West Europe.  
3. On the concept of politicization 
I believe this can be especially well captured in case of such concepts as politicization and 
patronage. As Meyer-Sahling-Veen (2012: 5) put it: “Party patronage is traditionally defined 
as the „distribution of divisible goods to party supporters‟”. In other words, in the Western 
literature, politicization is a way to reward party supporters, to strengthen the party itself. 
According to the author, however, in the CEE countries politicization most of all serves the 
purpose of effective controlling of the government by political masters and not party 
purposes. Namely, ministers and other political heads of administrative units rely on 
patronage to control the administration. Meyer-Sahling-Veen qualifies this statement as a 
major research finding. Kopecky-Spirova, without reflecting to the fact that this statement 
contradicts the mainstream Western literature, self-evidently mention that patronage may 
serve the purpose of “control[ling] state institutions” (p.903) besides rewarding supporters. 
Moreover, they claim, on the basis of quantitative findings, that controlling administration is 
much (at least five times) more important, than just rewarding party supporters (pp. 911-914).  
Political leaders of the administration seemingly do not trust the “system”, they trust only 
“people” loyal to them. Moreover, as most senior civil servants were appointed on a political 
basis, new ministers may be quite right to distrust the organization run by these officials and 
look for new ones who are loyal to them. This may go on as a vicious circle; a process that 
may have started with the first democratically elected, non-communist Cabinet that replaced 
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leaders of the communist nomenclature by officials trusted by the new, democratically elected 
leaders, naturally and admittedly on the basis of political (personal) loyalty.   
In this arrangement personal ties and loyalty of senior civil servants is crucial. This is 
frequently not party or political but purely personal loyalty to the minister or other political 
appointee. (A fact that is largely hidden by the term “politicization” and perfectly excluded 
from the “Western” meaning of the concept.) For instance, in Hungary, permanent state 
secretaries supposedly being the professional heads of ministries who assure continuity of 
administrative functioning, were typically replaced if a new minister came into office, even if 
that happened in the same government (parliamentary cycle) and the minister was from the 
same party. Thus, permanent (!) state secretaries stayed in position in average for two years.  
(Gajduschek 2008: 90)  Kopecky-Spirova, asking a question about the role of political vs. 
purely personal loyalty in their expert survey, found that in about half of the cases personal 
loyalty to the political leader is a crucial decision criteria in appointing senior officials (pp. 
914-915). The importance of personal loyalty seems to be crucial in some types of 
politicization (e.g. “personal decision of the minister or state secretary”) analyzed by 
Beblavy-Beblava (p. 14) as well.  
I would add to the above conclusions that some of the non-merit appointments may be 
interpreted as a sign of a soft budget constraint, using Kornai‟s (1980, 1986) term here, rather 
than an occurrence of politicization. People who do not find employment in private sector 
may try to get some kind of public employment using their personal relationships. I found, for 
instance, that in the early years of transition in Hungary, when large “socialist companies” 
and agricultural “cooperatives” collapsed, the proportion of engineers and agrarian 
professionals in civil service has dramatically boosted (from 18% in 1985 to 39% in 1994) 
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though the changing functions of government (end of central planning and control of 
industrial and agricultural units) required an opposite trend. (Gajduschek 2008: 147-149) A 
similar phenomenon is indicated by Kopecky-Spirova “in areas outside the capital where 
incomes are substantially lower” (p. 204), and something similar may be embedded in the 
“coalition-based appointments” described by Beblavy-Beblava (p. 14) as a type of 
politicization that appears typically at local government units. Thus, this phenomenon may be 
treated in the conceptual framework of politicization and patronage as discussed at Session 4, 
on one side, but could be a critical point for public choice theorist as well, as an indicator for 
soft budget constraint, the lack of serious pressure for efficiency. Namely, public agencies 
employ people with qualification that is not needed for their position, a phenomenon that has 
not much to do with politicization.    
4. On Civil Service Laws 
The role of legal regulations has been discussed in some presentations (especially: Beblavy-
Bebelava) and the debate during the session as well. As Meyer-Sahling-Veen indicate in their 
paper, in accordance with several other authors like Nunberg 1999, Verheijen 1999, 
Gajduschek 2012, the existence of civil service laws was considered for long, both by local 
and by foreign experts, as an indication of a merit based, politically neutral administrative 
system. In fact, the existence of such laws is hardly a guarantee against politicization, as quite 
frequently even detailed laws do not regulate such crucial elements as selection and 
appointment procedures. This statement is supported by quantitative empirical data as well. 
For instance Meyer-Sahling-Veen indicate that the Czech Republic without a civil service law 
is somewhat less politicized than Hungary that adopted the very first comprehensive civil 
service law in the region. The comparison between these two countries results in the same 
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conclusion in the paper of  Kopecky-Spirova. Meyer-Sahling-Veen also review that Baltic 
states, which were surely not the forerunners of adapting comprehensive civil service laws, 
are by far the least politicized. This reinforces our experience that laws frequently serve not as 
stimuli or manifestations of but rather as substitutes for real action in depoliticizing civil 
service, as Nunberg (1999: 256) stated more than a decade ago. The discussion at the 
conference seemed to conclude that legal regulations play minor role in creating a merit 
system and preventing large-scale politicization. Spirova, however, warned that civil servants 
may initiate legal action and in that way laws still can influence real procedures. From the 
remarks of several participants from other CEE countries, it seemed that such an impact of 
regulation exists in most of the CEE countries. However, these sporadic and random cases 
may not have a systematic impact. From a jurisprudential point of view this arrangement in 
fact largely contradicts the major function of modern law. Law, as the only generally valid 
normative system of modern societies whose rules are followed commonly, supposed to 
introduce high level of predictability in a risky and unpredictable social life. If laws are 
enforced only in rare and random cases they can hardly fulfill their function of uncertainty 
reduction. On the contrary, this type of law enforcement rather increases uncertainty and 
surely cannot result in a merit-based, depoliticized civil service systems. Furthermore, as 
Meyer-Sahling (2011) and Verheijen (1999) indicated earlier, civil service regulations are 
regularly changed without much ado if that is necessary to replace “old” personnel with a new 
one, loyal to the new ruling politicians.  
A concluding hypothesis: Plea for non-institutional approach 
As a subjective, perhaps oversimplified and surely over-generalized conclusion, it seems to 
me that institutions, like neutral, professional bureaucracy and legal regulations, do not really 
8 
 
function in the region and/or political leaders of the government do not really trust them. 
(Weakness of institutions on one hand and the belief systems of politicians on the other in this 
regard may constantly reinforce and reproduce one another.) Instead of institutions personal 
relationships, to put it more fashionably: networks, are relied on. Modern bureaucracy, as 
described by Max Weber a century ago, is characterized by a depersonalized nature that is 
perhaps the most crucial element of this institutional arrangement and is the sharpest 
difference from all previous forms of administration. In CEE countries, however, 
administration functions, or is managed, in a more personalized manner that reminds us more 
ancient, pre-bureaucratic forms.  
In this arrangement, neo-institutional approach emphasizing institutions like organizations 
and (legal or moral) norms seem to be less effective to explain the administrative system of 
CEE countries. This approach occurred largely as a reaction to approaches (e.g. neoclassical 
economics and game theory) that are based on the presumption of utility-maximizing 
individuals surrounded by similarly rational actors. Neo-institutionalism seems to be the 
mainstream social science approach applied also towards public administration. I believe that 
this approach is not only less adequate for understanding non-Western societies but in most 
cases fruitless or even misleading. Formal institutions in these countries seem to be quite 
similar to their Western counterparts. But these institutions exists on the surface only, as 
facades without real content; these institutions just do not function in social practice. Based on 
our present knowledge, approaches regarding actors as pure utility maximizers may provide 
more reliable findings than those taking formal institutions seriously. An alternative approach 
could be to concentrate on “informal rules” as it is done by more and more authors who see 
that formal institutions are empty shells. (E.g. Falkner 2008, Dimitrova 2010.) The main 
question in this regard if there are generally shared informal institutions.   
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